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Materialist Variations on Spinoza
Theoretical Alliances and Political Strategies
MARIANA DE GAINZA
MORAL PHILOSOPHY OR ETHICS?
In his 1963 lectures, Theodor Adorno said that it was important not
to abandon reflection on the ‘good life’ in terms of a moral philosophy
and to resist the temptation of replacing its concepts with those of an
ethics.1 In broad strokes, his argument was the following: It is clear
that the notion of morality rests on an essential conformism because it
presupposes an ideal convergence between individual behaviour and
public customs, so that the good life amounts to an obedience to com-
munity norms and acceptance of its actual forms. What is more, this
conformism (a respect for a petrified facade of opinion and society) is
redoubled by the affinity between morals and Puritan values: the Pur-
itan subject’s rigidity and narrow conventionalism is perfectly suited to
a reactive defence against any questioning of the status quo.That iswhy
a preference instead for the notion of ethics—as a call to live according
to one’s own nature — would thus seem admissible. If the definition
of the ethical good life refers to the capacity to deploy, according to
1 TheodorW. Adorno, Problems of Moral Philosophy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 2001).
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one’s own time and dispositions, each ethos or mode of singular being,
then it seems to offer a sort of antidote against an externally imposed
morality.
However, this call for an ethics of the ‘good life’, while understand-
able, is just ‘pure illusion and ideology’.2 Beyond the emptiness of the
assertion that one must live in harmony with one’s own being lies the
fact that the contents of one’s self-identity, which are thought to be
genuinely spontaneous, are in fact provided by the dominant culture.
Congruence with one’s own constitution or nature is nothing more
than a form of compliance with certain cultural values. A naturalist
ethics would thus be a kind of ‘bad conscience of morality’, a ‘morality
that is ashamed of its ownmoralizing’ that still behaves asmorality but
no longer wishes to be a ‘moralizing morality’.3
For these reasons, Adorno prefers to retain the concept of ‘mor-
ality’, which, despite its anachronism and evident limitations, has the
advantage of avoiding further adulterations of the true problem: the
contradiction between the particular and the general, between free-
dom and law, or better still, between empirical existence and the good
life, which is an unrealizable aim in the context of an oppressive norm.
If we were to accept certain prejudices supposing the incompati-
bility between critical-dialectical philosophies and Spinozism,4 then it
would follow that Spinoza’s Ethics can also be subject to the Adornian
critique of ethics. Indeed, there is a contemporaneous sort of neo-
Spinozism which is perfectly in line with a neoliberal ethos that is
associatedwith a pervasive rhetoric revolving around desire and affect.
Along with the political and communicative strategies of global right-
wing parties and tendencies, these neo-Spinozist perspectives imagine
individuals as subjects of an affective self-consciousness that knows
how to recognize what it loves and hates, a self-consciousness that
defends the freedom to determinewhat it shall consume. But the items
that one ‘spontaneously’ prefers or chooses (which can be such differ-
ent things as commercial goods, political ideas, current information,
or beliefs) tend to coincide, in point of fact, with a preference that
2 Ibid., p. 10.
3 Ibid.
4 Prejudices associated, in particular, to the tradition of readings of Spinozism that
comes from Gilles Deleuze and passes through Antonio Negri.
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has already been defined in another scene as the most suitable for
that given profile. As an ideological mode, contemporary capitalism
both reflects and reinforces the demand for accumulation, on the one
hand, and the affective dispositions of the subjects, on the other, in a
kind of virtuous convergence of differences that intends to uphold the
expansion of global financial power.
This convergence is a fitting illustration of precisely what Adorno
was concerned with in his critique of ethics. This is why I think it is
imperative to assert — against those prejudices that rigidly separate
dialectics and immanence — that Spinoza’s Ethics can and should be
approached with the Adornian gesture that denounces the purported
identity between particular and universal, and replaces it with contra-
diction, a contradiction that can still be found in moral philosophy
today despite its conservative tendencies.
SPINOZA’S MATERIALISM
The approach of combining Adorno and Spinoza that I attempt here
is based on a materialist reading of Spinoza, whose articulating axes
are worth explaining. The term ‘materialism’ is a problematic one. It
does not help us to form a clearly shaped perspective because it was
used to designate very different theories which are, in many cases,
mutually incompatible. It is a noun traversed by the echoes of various
controversies (between realism and idealism, empiricism and innat-
ism, objectivism and subjectivism) that have been present as tensions
within philosophy from the beginning; to put it more precisely, they
have been present as tensions ever since Hegelian philosophy retro-
actively (and controversially) organized the history of philosophy
into the confrontation of opposing positions. In any case, I want to
cautiously assume this heritage, albeit in the way in which a certain
Spinozian Marxism has re-signified it.
To consider how amodern sense of ‘materialism’ reached Spinoza,
it is worth recalling that Robert Boyle (whose experiments on nitro
were discussed in Spinoza’s Correspondence) was the first to intro-
duce the term, in 1674, in his work The Excellency and Grounds of the
Corpuscular or Mechanical Philosophy. Between theorists and chemists
that embraced the postulates of corpuscular-mechanical philosophy,
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‘materialists’ were those that reduced phenomena to a few material
components.This sense of the noun was consolidated when Cartesian
dualism rewrote the old controversies about matter and form as an
assertion of the existence of two substances: extended reality and
thinking reality. Since that transformation, threemajor traditions, sep-
arated by their ontological emphasis, can be identified within modern
philosophy: one that assigns a privileged reality to the ideal or psychic
(spiritualism), to the material or physical (materialism), or to the
balanced character of a reality that encompasses both ontological di-
mensions (monism).
In addition, in terms of Spinozist philosophy it is also relevant
to consider the ‘ancient materialism’ represented by the atomism of
Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius — a philosophical current that
also interested Marx, who wrote his doctoral thesis on ‘The Differ-
ence between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature’.
Spinoza vindicated the ancient materialists in an explicitly controver-
sial way when he wrote against the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition:
To me the authority of Plato, Aristotle, and Socrates is not
worth much. I would have been amazed if you had mentioned
Epicurus,Democritus, Lucretius, or any of theAtomists, or de-
fenders of invisible particles. But it’s nowonder that the people
who invented occult qualities, intentional species, substantial
forms, and a thousandother trifles contrived ghosts and spirits,
and believed old wives’ tales, to lessen the authority of Demo-
critus, whose good reputation they so envied that they had
all his books burned, which he had published with such great
praise.5
Furthermore, in relation to contemporary discourse, let us consider
the statement about Spinoza’s materialism made by Pierre-François
Moreau:
We can talk about a materialism in Spinoza on the condition
that we do not thereby understand a determination of the
mind by the body. To those who object that Spinoza […]
maintains the balance between mind and body, [and therefore
is] as spiritualist or idealist as he is materialist, wemust answer
5 Ep. lvi [to Hugo Boxel]; CWS [TheCollectedWorks of Spinoza, see abbreviations], ii,
p. 423.
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that, precisely, tradition does not maintain that balance, and
the simple fact of giving the body as much importance as
the mind already constitutes an enormous effort of materialist
rebalancing.6
Let us retain what Moreau calls here a rebalancing effort, that is to
say, a kind of compensatory endeavour that uses the same conceptual
elements of a philosophical tradition but adjusts the importance given
to them. When that rebalancing — as in the case of Spinoza — works
by rescuing the body from its traditional subordination to the mind,
such an effort can legitimately be considered materialist. However,
the image of a balance that must be restored, of a compensation or
counterweight that works by levelling out an imbalance, does not fit
Spinozist materialism as I understand it. Such a metaphor supposes
that the elements whose relative weightsmust be equalized are already
constituted and that it is only necessary to modify the weights in the
balance to stabilize it.
This model is overly simplistic where a ‘materialist rebalancing’ is
concerned. The Spinozian valuation of the body, rather than compen-
sating with an undervaluation (giving the body as much importance
as the mind), constitutes a theoretical innovation that transforms the
idea of the body, insofar as thought is capable of doing justice to the ir-
reducible reality it faces.Thismeans that the body can be apprehended
in its own corporeal being when it is understood through the absolute
quality or attribute that explains it — without referring it to a mind.
The effort to understand a particular thing is made on the basis of
the recognition of its irreducibility (without homologating it to other
things or realities).
With this in mind, the terms of Moreau’s statement can be re-
formulated as follows: Spinoza’s enormous effort of materialist re-
balancing consists of an anti-hierarchical ontological equalization of
essentially unequal realities, an ‘adjustment’ made through the rec-
ognition of an essential imbalance: in this way, he has achieved a
theoretical justice for heterogeneous realities. So this Spinozian effort
is materialist, not because the body is its object (it is clear that we
can elaborate a materialist understanding of the ideas, as it is common
6 Pierre-FrançoisMoreau,Problèmesdu spinozisme (Paris:Vrin, 2006), p. 65;my translation.
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to find idealist theories of the body), but because it builds the just
perspective that takes each reality into account, considering its irredu-
cibility. Therefore,materialism is an ontological way of conceiving the
power of thought to understand the singular quality of a reality.
TOWARDS A CARTOGRAPHY OF CONTEMPORARY SPINOZISM
With this notion of materialism in mind, we can now redirect the dis-
cussionback toour initial aimof relocating thequestionof ethicswithin
materialism and in dialogue with critical theory. I will develop a sort
of cartography of contemporary Spinozism, taking as a starting point a
citation from Pierre Macherey, who said that ‘Spinoza obsesses and
haunts us as if his work were a theoretical unconscious that condi-
tions and guides a large part of our intellectual choices and effective
commitments; and that helps us to reformulate most of the problems
that concern us’.7 Using Macherey’s idea, I will assert that a set of
contemporary readings of Spinoza can be grouped under the head-
ing ‘Spinozism’, understood as the response to something condensed
in the name ‘Spinoza’ that both obsesses, haunts, and conditions us:
something that orients intellectual alternatives and practical commit-
ments, and that lends a particular contour to certain inquiries, both
ethical-political and theoretical.
While determining the Spinozist camp in this way it is possible
to distinguish different interpretations. We can reproduce those inter-
pretations and distribute them along an axis, the purpose of which
would be to measure how the haunting of Spinoza is acknowledged
by his readers, or what kind of relationship is established between a
given thought and a Spinozist idea. Firstly, I would like to imagine
the pure form wherein a thought considered to be a ‘theoretical un-
conscious’ would manifest itself: as an explicit absence, or a merely
implicit presence. There thus exists a mode of ‘thinking in Spinoza’,
where ‘Spinoza’, rather than being the object addressed by thought for
further examination, instead constitutes a sort of speculative element, a
terrain or medium in which thinking takes place. This mode of inter-
pretation appears, for example, in Freud’s declared affinity for Spinoza,
7 Pierre Macherey, Avec Spinoza. Études sur la doctrine et l’histoire du spinozisme (Paris:
PUF, 1992), p. 7; my translation.
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when hewrites in a letter: ‘I readily admitmy dependence on Spinoza’s
doctrine. There was no reason why I should expressly mention his
name, since I conceived my hypotheses from the atmosphere created
by him, rather than from the study of his work. Moreover, I did not
seek a philosophical legitimation’.8 Secondly, there are researchers in
the history of philosophy who have produced an enormous amount of
texts in a field identified as Spinoza Studies. In these cases, Spinoza is
the explicit object of the inquiry, and the haunting force of his name
manifests itself in the rigorous and in-depth efforts of researchers to
reconstruct the conceptual framework of his system.
Between these two extremes of interpretation (Spinoza as an ex-
plicit object of study, and Spinoza as a speculative element, absent
from the actual research) a reading such as Althusser’s explicitly asserts
the Spinozian perspective as the supporting framework for his own
theoretical interventions — yet he does so without elaborating the
specific connections that were useful for him. Althusser effectively dis-
plays a mode of ‘being Spinozist’ that consists in taking from Spinoza
certain hypothesis that he never proclaimed but did authorize;9 in
fact, these Spinozist coordinates can be seen all throughout Althusser’s
texts, where they act as a type of channel for his own discourse that
then flows — while contained by that immanent structure — onto
other vital and urgent matters.
Another famous interpretation of Spinoza, in this case byDeleuze,
also responds to the interpellation produced by the name ‘Spinoza’.
Deleuze became the explicit interlocutor of a philosophical conver-
sation that creates a common discursive groundwork. I would say
that the terms of Deleuze’s philosophy emerge through a composi-
tion with other voices (among which Spinoza’s and Nietzsche’s voices
figure prominently), while they also display an analysis whose plasti-
8 Sigmund Freud to Lothar Bickel, 28 June 1931, quoted fromYirmiyahu Yovel, Spinoza
andOtherHeretics:TheAdventures of Immanence (Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity
Press, 1989), p. 139; English translation in H. Z. Winnik, ‘A Long-Lost and Recently
Recovered Letter of Freud’, Israel Annals of Psychiatry, 13 (1975), pp. 1–5.
9 ‘We were guilty of an equally powerful and compromising passion: we were Spinozists.
In our own way, of course, which was not Brunschvicg’s! And by attributing to the
author of the Tractatus Theologico- Politicus and the Ethics a number of theses which
he would surely never have acknowledged, though they did not actually contradict
him’. Louis Althusser, ‘On Spinoza’, in Essays in Self-Criticism, trans. by Grahame Lock
(London: New Left Books, 1976), pp. 132–41 (p. 132).
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city seeks to distil the conceptual content of things themselves. And
different results arise from the reciprocal contamination of these spe-
cific interlocutions: a Deleuzian Spinoza, a Deleuzian Nietzsche, a
Spinozian/Nietzschean Deleuze; but also a Nietzschean Spinoza and
a Spinozian Nietzsche.
From a different angle, we can observe that while Deleuze’s read-
ing is more philosophical than political, a reading such as Antonio
Negri’s, which draws directly on Deleuze, is more political than philo-
sophical. Negri’s interpretation has inspired a whole series of contem-
porary uses of Spinoza that renew his concepts as a kind of stimulant
for political action in the present. Responding to the urgent nature of
suchmultivalent interventions, the name ‘Spinoza’ is wielded as a kind
of ontological guarantee for the emancipation of humanity.
The underlying benefit of understanding these different ways of
relating to Spinoza is that they represent different ways of actualiz-
ing immanence, and this is true whether his philosophy appears as a
speculative atmosphere favouring the production of ideas, or as an
underlying structure explaining a series of argumentative moves, or
as the theoretical-political inspiration for an imagination that trusts in
concrete horizons of collective happiness.
To return to the polarity that organizes this argument, I would say
that the works in the history of philosophy that address Spinoza as
their explicit object of study principally focus upon the immanence of
history in his philosophical texts. Spinoza’s thought is reconstructed as
a situated thought that participates in the life of his time and all the de-
bates that traverse it; and this reading, which extends from the present
back to seventeenth-century thought, argues for a universal dimension
of certain human dilemmas. Of course, the readings I have located at
the opposite side of the spectrum do not suppress history, but they
relate immanence to the power of the human intellect to produce ef-
fects. When Freud admits his dependence on Spinoza’s philosophy,
he means that immanence is connected to the power of the singular
and a certain dimension of universal experience. But now immanence
refers to an ethics whereby ‘knowledge is the most powerful affect’.10
10 ‘I am really amazed, really delighted! I have a precursor, andwhat a precursor! I hardly
knew Spinoza: what brought me to him now was the guidance of instinct. Not only
is his whole tendency like my own — to make knowledge the most powerful passion
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Thus, methodological precautions around historical distance are not
of any great concern for this type of Spinozism, wherein everything
that may emerge from the reader’s sensibility and acuity is suitable for
discovering or inventing other realities and concepts.
The range of readings that I have briefly sketched out are dis-
tributed according to the nuances resulting from the tension between
the presence or absence of Spinoza. This same series of contempor-
ary readings (whose shared affinity, as I have said, can be considered
from Macherey’s idea of Spinoza as a theoretical unconscious) can be
further interrogated by analysing their position in relation to Marxist
philosophical and political debates from the 1960s onward. This is
especially important because these ‘Spinozisms’ were essential for this
period’s response to the hegemony of Hegelian philosophy in critical
theory (that is to say, in the theory that was affected, under various
modes, by the theoretical revolution of Marx). Within this new virtual
axis, which intercepts the aforementioned one, the relevant polarity
distinguishes two positions vis-à-vis Hegelian dialectics: an open re-
jection (Deleuze) and a critical revision (Althusser).
It was Deleuze who most decisively responded to the challenge
of breaking with dialectical negativity, and instead asserted the central
concept of his project as difference. According to Deleuze, the concept
of contradiction began to reveal its conservative core when compared
to the potentialities that came with a politics of difference: he argued
that contradiction revealed itself as a constellation of sad passions as-
sociated with the interiorization of subjection, a culture dominated
by the specular dynamic of resentment, and a logic that ultimately
served as an accomplice to the state’s quest to capitalize on social
conflicts for the accumulation of power. By contrast, Althusser was
more cautious in his questioning of dialectics and, in his self-critical
writings, ultimately recognized that ‘aMarxist cannotmake the detour
— but also in five main points of his doctrine I find myself; this most abnormal and
lonely thinker is closest to me in these points precisely: he denies free will, purposes,
the moral world order, the nonegoistical, evil; of course the differences are enormous,
but they are differences more of period, culture, field of knowledge. In summa: my
solitariness which, as on very highmountains, has often, oftenmademe gasp for breath
and lose blood, is now at least a solitude for two. Strange!’. Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘To
Franz Overbeck [Postmarked Sils Engd., July 30, 1881]’, in Christopher Middleton,
Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996),
pp. 176–77 (p. 177).
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via Spinoza without paying for it. For the adventure is perilous, and
whatever you do, you cannot find in Spinoza whatHegel gave toMarx:
contradiction’.11 Given Althusser’s commitment to the renovation of
Marxist thought, he performed an incisive critique of the contempor-
ary versions of Marxism — especially those whose response to the
determinist suffocation of the ‘laws of history’ was a subjectivist vol-
untarism that placed its faith in the end of oppression — while still
never claiming outright that dialectical thought should be abandoned.
The complexity of immanent causality was arraigned in order to coun-
teract the simplifying and homogenizing nature of Hegelian dialectics,
wherein the object of critique became the specific structures of idealist
dialectics (that is, the simple negation, the negation of the negation,
the identity of contraries, the transformation of quantity into quality,
and the logic of the dialectical overcoming). Althusser pursued all this
without eliminating the notion of contradiction from the conceptual
horizon, which remained necessary for thinking of politics in its con-
stitutively conflictual dimension.
Having offered this sort of cartography of contemporary Spinozist
materialism, I must confess my own affinities: in the axis that displays
the presence or absence of a direct reference to Spinoza in discourses
attempting to address the present conjuncture, my sympathies lie with
the Freudian strategy. I think the potency of the Spinozian perspec-
tive is at its most uniquely productive when one assumes it as one’s
own —without accepting the interdictions that come with speak-
ing a ‘Spinozist langue’. Along the other axis distributing positions
facing dialectics, my sympathies are with the Althusserian strategy:
the acceptance that one must be anti-dialectical in order to think on
Spinoza’s terms not only impoverishes the conceptual universe, but
also leads to serious political limitations if it means to renounce incis-
ive moments of twentieth-century emancipatory thought (especially
works such as Adorno’s, which sought to combat fascism in its several
manifestations that included those of Western democracies).
Furthermore, a certain negative dialectics becomes necessary
when, as I have suggested, there exists (as there does today) a type of
neo-Spinozism that is functional to the neoliberal ethos. The manage-
ment of affects by the global right-wing movements and governments
11 Althusser, ‘On Spinoza’, p. 141.
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is evinced in two complementary ways. On the one hand, stoking and
channelling social hatred, which in turn becomes the affective infra-
structure required to demonize social policies and their beneficiaries
and to spread an anti-political attitude among the masses (in Latin
America, the right-wing forces have sought, in this way, to delegitimize
the politics pursued by progressive governments — who are disquali-
fied as populists—over the last decade).On the other hand, cultivating
false emotions and banal happiness as the support for positive thinking
that disposes people to deny pain (their own and that of others) and
inhibit their sensitivity to the point that they become numb and are
unable to recognize any kind of distress. This form of positive think-
ing reinforces adaptation to ever more hostile conditions of life and
neutralizes any critical reflexivity that would allow for a questioning of
the purported inevitability of the neoliberal course of the world. The
resulting disposition is one in which people trust and wait for busi-
nessmen and post-fascist leaders to join up with the individual efforts
of those who deserve the good life (that is, the part of the population
that ‘puts in the effort’ and struggles to survive ‘without outside assist-
ance’). Against both tendencies, it would be useful to exercise a certain
Adornian dialectical negativity.
Now I will attempt to assimilate the Adorno/Spinoza intersection
into this schema that presses for the importance of certain theoretical
alliances in the name of a materialist critique of the contemporary
world.
SPINOZA AND ADORNO, ALLIES IN CRITICISM
Adorno and Spinoza can be regarded as materialist critics of moral
philosophy because both of them depart from the Platonic tradition
in a similar way. The model of the subject that emerges from Platonic
philosophy — as the theoretical response to a practical need to justify
the existing social order — is replicated across Western philosophical
moralism right up until the present day. When that moralism seeks to
justify the social order by relying on the identitybetweenparticular and
general, Adorno responds by emphasizing the falsehood of that iden-
tification and re-establishing the legibility of the contradiction hidden
by the idealist operation.
36 MATERIALIST VARIATIONS
Spinoza’s political anti-moralism, which he asserts as anti-
Platonic,12 goes with his Machiavellianism. His assertion that ‘no
men are less suitable to guide Public Affairs than Theorists, or
Philosophers’13 is in direct conflict with the Platonic model of the
Philosopher King. But against the temptation of a vulgarly pragmatic
interpretation of this defence of politics against philosophical
idealism, Spinozian ethics is far from any immediate facticity (that is
to say, far from the affirmation of the things and men in their existing
state) and instead produces something that is explicitly labelled as a
‘model’: one must ‘form an idea of man, a model of human nature
which we may look to’. This is then a theoretical-practical necessity
that is upheld by straining the system’s own postulates: although
nature does not work in favour of ends or models, and despite the
fact that nothing in it can be regarded as either perfect or imperfect,
‘we shall say that men are more perfect or imperfect, insofar as they
approach more or less near to this model’.14
So, while Spinoza’s ethics is anti-moralist on the practical terrain,
and anti-Platonic on the philosophical terrain, it nevertheless calls for
the need to use ideal models (analogous to what moral philosophy
conceives of as the ‘ought’ that guides all behaviour).The counterpoint
between reality and model, between the actual functioning of things
and the invocation of another, sought-aftermode of being, is deployed
in order to think of human types and forms of life capable of condensing
the critical energies of the present. And that operation allows for non-
conventional modes of conceiving of the meaning of realism within
philosophical-political discussion.
Therefore, the opposition between reality andmodel in Spinozian
ethics can be schematized in the following manner: if the image of
man evoking an inexistent human nature corresponds to norms of an
existing social order, the idea of man, arising from what an actually
existing human nature can do, would correspond to a non-existent
social order, since it would emerge from the transformation of the
present.
12 See Ep. lvi [to Hugo Boxel]; CWS ii, p. 423.
13 TP i, 1; CWS ii, p. 504.
14 Ethics iv, Praef.; CWS i, p. 545.
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I would argue that this counterpoint coincides precisely with the
‘contradiction’ that Adorno says we must not abandon: the short-
circuit at the heart of reality itself. But if we think this alongside
Spinoza, we are able to see that this ‘contradiction’ does not assume the
form of a logical contradiction. Instead, it has the complex structure of
a chiasmus, which contrasts a false reality with a true model. Against
the false reality—where the idealized, non-existent individual (whose
free self-determination is based on his desire, will, and understanding)
responds to the imperatives of an existing order (which requires the
aforementioned falsity for its own reproduction) — a true model is
invoked, one which connects the power of the collectively existing
individual with the possibility of a just, non-existent order.
However, it must be said that this model is not an utopian one:
efforts of thought aimed at this transformation are not guided by an
image of a future society to be obtained (‘a Fantasy, possible only in
Utopia’15) but rather by the attempt to think the actual given condi-
tions and developments unfolding from a situation in the sense of its
subversion.
The idea of a ‘model’, which serves the role of imagining a real-
ity more perfect than the present reality, constitutes a peculiar type
of realism which is far from all pragmatic reproductive possibilism.
Thinking rigorously from the conditions of a present conjuncture does
not mean, however, that the political response to this concrete situ-
ation is conceived of as the political expression of those conditions, that
is, as a political ratification of facts. Quite the contrary: this political
response is motivated by the desire to transform those conditions, a
desire which is recognized in an imperative: suffering must cease. Such
an imperative is clearly not derived from the norms that organize this
given order, but rather from the sensibility associated with another
ethics or morality.
To conclude, what I am suggesting here is that this anti-Platonic,
Spinozian/Machiavellian realism is compatible with the Adornian cri-
tiqueof facticity andadministrativeutopianism that tries to spiritualize
it; and it is compatible with the fragile promise of emancipation that
emerges from the determinate negation of this actuality.
15 TP i, 1; CWS ii, p. 503.
 
 
Mariana de Gainza, ‘Materialist Variations on Spinoza: The-
oretical Alliances and Political Strategies’, in Materialism and
Politics, ed. by Bernardo Bianchi, Emilie Filion-Donato, Mar-
lon Miguel, and Ayşe Yuva, Cultural Inquiry, 20 (Berlin: ICI
Berlin Press, 2021), pp. 25–37 <https://doi.org/10.37050/ci-
20_01>
REFERENCES
Adorno, Theodor W., Problems of Moral Philosophy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
2001)
Althusser, Louis, ‘On Spinoza’, in Essays in Self-Criticism, trans. by Grahame Lock (London:
New Left Books, 1976), pp. 132–41
Macherey, Pierre, Avec Spinoza. Études sur la doctrine et l’histoire du spinozisme (Paris: PUF,
1992)
Moreau, Pierre-François, Problèmes du spinozisme (Paris: Vrin, 2006)
Nietzsche, Friedrich, ‘To Franz Overbeck [Postmarked Sils Engd., July 30, 1881]’, in Chris-
topher Middleton, Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1996), pp. 176–77
Spinoza, Benedictus de,The Collected Works of Spinoza, ed. and trans. by Edwin Curley, 2 vols
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985–2016)
Winnik, H. Z., ‘A Long-Lost and Recently Recovered Letter of Freud’, Israel Annals of Psychi-
atry, 13 (1975), pp. 1–5
Yovel, Yirmiyahu, Spinoza and Other Heretics: The Adventures of Immanence (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1989)
R-1
